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The market represents the paradigmatic example of an economic mechanism. Adam 
Smith famously theorized it as functioning as if led by an invisible hand so as to 
satisfy the needs of market participants. Over the years the market has been variously 
theorized as a mechanism for resource allocation, price discovery, assignment of 
property rights and many other things besides (cf. Rosenbaum, 2000; Mirowski, 
2007). At the same time, it has also come to be treated more and more abstractedly 
and transported far from the economic domain to become a mechanism for 
phenomena as diverse as mating behavior in animals, competition between churches, 
and marriage choices – instances of a wider trend known as economics imperialism 
(Mäki, 2009a). In spite of the centrality of the market mechanism, however, 
economics is not solely concerned with market-related phenomena. In fact, a 
recurring theme of this chapter will be that economics is distinct from the other social 
sciences not so much by virtue of the kind of real-world mechanisms (and 
phenomena) with which it deals, but because of the way in which mechanisms are 
identified and analyzed. What I hope to highlight is the role that economists’ 
methodological commitments play in defining what counts as a mechanism in 
economics.  
In economics the term mechanism has various uses. Julian Reiss (2013, p. 
104-105) identifies four different notions. The first is the econometricians’ notion of 
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mechanisms as individual causal relations. The contrast here is with mere correlation. 
The second refers to variables that intervene between a cause and an effect and, as 
Reiss observes, it is often used in the context of causal inference. The third takes 
mechanisms to be underlying structures or processes (for example, the market), while 
the fourth takes mechanisms to be pieces of theory (for example, a theoretical 
hypothesis showing the conditions under which the market clears). It is mainly the 
last two notions, to which I will simply refer as mechanisms as underlying structures, 
that come the closest to the conception of mechanisms advanced by current 
mechanistic philosophers. It is also the one with which I will be mainly concerned in 
this chapter, even though, as we will see, the notions of mechanisms as underlying 
structures and as intervening variables are not always kept clearly separate in 
philosophical discussions about causal inference and extrapolation (cf. Kincaid, 
2004).  
Mechanisms have been prominent in recent philosophical reflections on 
economics: they have been claimed to provide justification for methodological 
individualism, to be necessary for causal inference and to aid extrapolation of causal 
claims from one context to another. In what follows, after giving a characterization of 
how mechanisms are conceived and represented in economics (Sections II and III), I 
discuss the alleged connection between mechanism and methodological individualism 
(Section IV), the role of mechanisms in causal inference from statistical data and 
extrapolation (Sections V and VI). Section VII offers some concluding remarks. 
II. What is a mechanism in economics? 
Let us begin with a minimal definition proposed as a way of capturing the basic 
features of mechanisms that contemporary mechanistic philosophers would agree on 
and that I take to characterize also what Reiss calls mechanisms as underlying 
	 3 
structures. 
 [M] A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities and activities 
organized in such a way that they are responsible for the phenomenon (Illari and 
Williamson 2012, p.120; see also Chapter 1 and Glennan, n.d.). 
Further features can be added to [M] to produce more specific accounts that restrict 
the scope of what kinds of things qualify as mechanisms. There are two ways in 
which [M] can be augmented to take into account the specificities of economics. The 
first concerns the kind of mechanism economics deals with, whereas the second 
concerns how economists identify and analyze mechanisms.  
 Dan Steel defines social mechanisms as follows: 
[SM] Social mechanisms are complexes of interacting individuals, usually 
classified into specific social categories, that generate causal relationships 
between aggregate-level variables (Steel, 2004, p. 59). 
 Compared to [M], [SM] involves individuals as component parts, individuals that are 
typically classified into social categories, such as buyers and sellers, fathers and 
daughters, and who engage in certain kinds of activities (such as buying and selling, 
providing a dowry and marrying) by virtue of the social roles they occupy. Starting 
from [SM], which is arguably a general description including economic mechanisms 
as a subset, one obvious way to single out economic mechanisms is by virtue of their 
being about particular kinds of social roles, namely those pertaining to the market, or 
the economy more generally. This is, however, at most only a tiny part of the story. 
Not only is economics concerned with phenomena that do not clearly pertain to the 
economy, but the other social sciences are also interested in (say) markets and 
market-related phenomena.  
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Another way of reformulating [SM] so as to take into account the specificity 
of economics is to include the type of assumptions economists make about the 
behavior of individuals, namely those assumptions that derive from economists’ 
commitment to rational-choice theory.ii Although sometimes rational-choice theory is 
interpreted as being concerned exclusively with individuals and their properties, 
however, it often presupposes structural and institutional facts, and its ‘individuals’ 
can also be firms, households, or organizations (see, for example, Kincaid, 1996; 
Janssen, 1993). To capture the latter feature, let us replace individuals with rational 
agents in [SM]. This gives us the following characterization of mechanisms in 
economics: 
[EM] Mechanisms in economics are complexes of rational agents, usually 
classified into social categories, whose actions and interactions generate 
causal relationships between aggregate-level variables. 
[EM] defines mechanisms on the basis of the kind of entities that compose them, 
namely agents, and the kind of properties ascribed to them, namely rational behavior. 
This is a descriptive (not a normative) claim about what economists (typically) take 
mechanisms to be and does not entail that this is what economic mechanisms really 
are. In what follows [EM] will be unpacked and related to some of the main debates 
concerning mechanisms in economics. 
III. Theoretical modeling of mechanisms 
What distinguishes economics from other social sciences is not only the kind of 
mechanisms economics deals in but also the way in which these mechanisms are 
studied. That is, mainly by building and analyzing simple models of mechanisms 
described at a high level of abstraction. This characteristic is captured by some of the 
most prominent accounts of models in economics. The connection between theoretical 
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models and mechanisms features in Mäki’s account, according to which economic 
models are means to isolate the operation of a mechanism from the interference of 
other factors (see, for example, Mäki 1992, 2009b).iii Similarly, Cartwright (2001, see 
also her 1989) claims that economic models are “blueprints for socio-economic 
machines”: by theoretical means models create the right conditions for mechanisms to 
operate unimpeded. Such conditions do not typically occur spontaneously in the real 
world, implying that the disturbing factors that in the models were isolated away will 
affect the mechanism’s operation. Of course, not all economic models aim at 
representing mechanisms; some are better thought of as “phenomenological” models 
(see Chapter 17). Moreover, those models that can be conceptualized as isolating 
mechanisms might not succeed in actually representing any real-world mechanism.  
In their modeling of mechanisms, economists also subscribe to a set of 
theoretical commitments and desiderata, which contributes to setting the modeling 
approach of economics apart from that of other sciences (Marchionni, 2013). First, the 
mechanistic requirement holds that the phenomenon to be explained should be shown 
to result from a mechanism that fits [EM] above. The legitimacy of the mechanistic 
requirement will be the topic of the next section. In particular, we will see that 
different interpretations of this requirement have different degrees of plausibility. A 
second desideratum economists emphasize relates to unification and requires that the 
mechanism be derived from a unifying theory, that is, rational-choice theory. 
Economists’ commitment to rational-choice theory has been harshly criticized: 
rational-choice theory has been found to be either empirically wanting, at least as a 
theory of individual behavior, or empirically vacuous. Its credentials as a unifying 
theory are also suspicious. As Reiss (2013) points out, its flexibility rather than its 
content account for its unifying power. This brings us to the third desideratum that 
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holds that other things being equal it is a good thing that the same kind of mechanism 
is shown to account for many phenomena. Since scope is typically a positive function 
of the level of abstraction at which a mechanism is described, the desideratum of 
generality leads to a preference for abstract descriptions of mechanisms. 
Consider, for example, the application of Hotelling’s model – in which firms 
choose where to locate spatially in order to maximize their market shares – to political 
parties choosing where to locate themselves in the political space in order to 
maximize the number of votes (Kuorikoski, 2009; see also Reiss, 2013). The main 
result of Hotelling’s model of spatial localization, according to which firms will tend 
to locate close to one another, is also shown to account for the fact that political 
parties tend towards the center of the political spectrum. It is the abstract “logic of the 
situation” that is hypothesized to be similar, and hence to account for the similarity 
between the economic and political phenomenon (Kuorikoski, 2009).iv This 
conception of mechanisms is compatible with the characterization of mechanisms in 
economics [EM], which in turn is compatible with the minimal definition [M]: in 
Hotelling’s model, the components are the firms (or the political parties), who by 
virtue of their socio-economic roles, perform activities that in interaction bring about 
the phenomenon to be explained.  
The ease with which abstract descriptions of mechanisms can be transferred 
across domains has drawbacks (Kuorikoski, 2009). Very little might be inferred about 
the political market for votes on the basis of the set of features it shares in common 
with standard markets, while at the same time relevant features specific to each 
domain might be unduly ignored. Furthermore, the similarity between “situations” 
does not automatically warrant inferences about properties of the agents across 
domains. For example, if the assumption of maximizing behavior might be justified 
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by the selection pressures the market exerts on firms, it is not necessarily the case that 
such behavior is legitimately attributed to political parties if similar selection 
pressures are absent or are counteracted by other institutional mechanisms. Finally, 
the strategy of building simple models of abstract mechanisms is likely to pose limits 
on the kind of phenomena economists would succeed in explaining. For some this is 
not a far-fetched possibility (see, for example, Lawson, 1997; Northcott and 
Alexandrova, 2015). 
IV. Methodological individualism 
Economists’ commitment to the doctrine of methodological individualism emerges 
with particular clarity from the belief that macroeconomics should be built on 
microeconomic foundations (Janssen, 1993; Hoover, 2001). The philosophical debate 
on micro foundations and methodological individualism has mainly concerned 
whether individual-level mechanisms are necessary for economic explanation and/or 
whether explanations that do include individual-level mechanisms are somehow better 
than purely macro-level explanations (Kincaid, 1996). To make the discussion more 
concrete, let us use a stylized example originally presented in Jackson and Pettit 
(1992), which I also discuss in Marchionni (2008).  
Suppose that the phenomenon to be explained is an increase in the crime rate 
in a particular neighborhood. Such an increase can be explained in two ways. An 
aggregate-level explanation identifies a recent increase in the level of unemployment 
as the cause of the increase in crime rate. An individual-level explanation instead 
would describe the changes in the opportunities and motivations of particular 
individuals. As a thesis about explanation, methodological individualism would hold 
either that the aggregate-level explanation alone does not explain or that in any case 
the individual-level explanation is better.  
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There is a sense in which the explanation is deficient. What is missing from 
the explanation is a description of the mechanism relating crime and unemployment. 
But does such a mechanism always need to be at the individual level? Harold Kincaid 
(1996) has offered both conceptual and empirical arguments against the claim that 
individual-level mechanisms are necessary for explanation. In its strongest version, 
methodological individualism holds that underlying mechanisms must only cite 
individuals and their properties. This is a non-starter, however: as mentioned above, 
rational-choice theory, the allegedly individualist theory par excellence, is not 
concerned only with individual behavior and often presupposes social kinds (Janssen, 
1993; Kincaid, 1996).  
A weaker version of the argument linking methodological individualism, 
mechanism and explanation takes it that individual-level explanations are somehow 
better. This idea, too, has been disputed. Compared to an aggregate-level explanation, 
the individual-level one, describing the changes in opportunities and motivations of 
particular individuals, misses relevant information, namely that irrespective of the 
behavior of particular individuals, an increase in unemployment would have brought 
about an increase in the crime rate (Jackson and Pettit 1992; Garfinkel, 1981; see also 
Kincaid 1996). These arguments show that neither an exclusively individual-level 
explanation nor an exclusively aggregate-level one is always to be preferred.v  
Finally, an even weaker version of methodological individualism takes it that 
the comparison should not be between an explanation that simply relates the level of 
unemployment and the crime rate and one that only cites individuals, their 
motivations and actions (Coleman, 1990; Janssen, 1993, Chapter 31). Instead, the 
issue is whether the aggregate-level explanation is improved by showing how an 
increase in the level of unemployment affects individuals and how this in turn causes 
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the crime rate to increase. For example, suppose now that the direction of causality 
goes from crime rate to unemployment level and that the agents’ choice of whether to 
engage in criminal activities as well as their opportunity to find a job is affected by 
the social network in which they interact (Granovetter, 1973). In particular, suppose 
that agents are more likely to engage in criminal activities the more people around 
them do so, and are more likely to find jobs the more people around them are actually 
employed. It follows that an increase in the crime rate in a particular neighborhood 
makes it more likely for an individual to interact with a criminal than with someone 
who is employed and can provide information about new jobs (Calvó-Armengol and 
Zenou, 2003, p.71). This contributes to increase the level of unemployment, which in 
turn contributes to increasing the crime rate. This is a mechanistic explanation, but the 
mechanism described is not a purely individual-level one. It describes how an 
aggregate variable (crime rate) affects another aggregate variable (unemployment 
level) via micro determinants (individuals’ job search) (see Figure 32.1).vi 
[Insert figure 32.1 here] 
This style of explanation is compatible with current mechanistic approaches to 
explanation. Although (constitutive) mechanisms are at a lower level than the 
phenomenon to be explained, levels of mechanisms do not map onto traditional 
compositional ones characterized by mereological or aggregative relations (Chapter 
14; Bechtel and Hamilton, 2007). Instead,  “X’s ϕ–ing is at a lower mechanistic level 
than S’s ψ-ing if and only if ϕ–ing is a component in the mechanism for S’s ψ-ing” 
(Craver, 2007, p.189). This means that philosophical accounts of mechanistic 
explanation do not require that mechanisms in economics should be at the individual 
level. For some economic phenomena, the agents interacting in the mechanism can be 
firms, organizations, whole countries, or even sub personal entities (Kincaid, 2004). 
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Furthermore, in a mechanistic explanation the level of organization as well as the 
environment in which mechanisms are embedded are also important– in our example, 
these are the networks of relations in which one is embedded and the change in the 
level of unemployment. If economists’ mechanistic requirement is interpreted as 
demanding that economic phenomena be explained by representing the multiple-level 
mechanisms that bring them about, then such a requirement can be justified along the 
lines proposed by current mechanistic philosophers. 
V. Causal inference 
Knowledge of mechanisms has been claimed to play a key role in making causal 
inferences from statistical data more secure. It has even been suggested that to 
distinguish genuine causal relations from mere correlations knowledge of mechanisms 
is necessary (Elster, 1983). As an illustration let us return to the crime-unemployment 
example. The idea is that knowledge of a connecting mechanism between the 
aggregate-level variables helps to identify whether the two variables are in fact 
causally connected, and the direction of causality, or are they both effects of a 
common unmeasured cause. What is under dispute is whether mechanisms are always 
necessary to identify genuine causal relations in the context of non-experimental 
research. Note that this claim has two interpretations: the quest for mechanisms can 
be interpreted as a quest for individual-level mechanisms or for lower-level 
mechanisms more generally. 
Kincaid (1996, pp. 179 -182) advances two objections to the first 
interpretation of this claim, that is, the necessity of individual-level mechanisms (see 
also Hoover, 2001; Reiss 2008; Steel 2004). The first is that there is no reason to stop 
at the level of individuals. If mechanisms are necessary to confirm causal relations, 
why shouldn’t we go down the hierarchy of levels until we reach the rock bottom? 
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Clearly such regress does not help the claim that individual-level mechanisms are 
necessary for causal inference in economics. vii The second objection is that causal 
relationships can be identified with enough confidence through other means such as 
randomized controlled trials or statistical techniques, and Kincaid offers a few 
examples of this. 
Even if we agree with Kincaid and others that evidence of individual-level 
mechanisms is not necessary for the confirmation of causal claims, it might still play a 
useful role. This is the position Steel (2004; 2011) advocates. The key to appreciate 
how evidence of mechanisms can help causal inference is to distinguish between 
direct and indirect casual inference (Steel, 2011). One of Steel’s illustrations 
concerns the postulated causal relationship between the legalization of abortion in 
1973 in the US and the decline of the crime rate in the 1990s (Donohue and Levitt, 
2001). Information about the micro-level mechanism, from being an unwanted child 
to criminality, was marshaled as further evidence of the causal link between 
legalization of abortion and decline of the crime rate. Direct causal inference concerns 
the causal relationship between legalization of abortion and decline of crime rates, 
whereas the indirect causal inference concerns the causal relationship between being 
an unwanted child and criminal behavior. The reason why evidence of the causal 
relationship between unwanted childhood and criminal behavior is valuable is 
practical: it concerns the fact that we might be in a position to make a stronger 
inference about the variables in the mechanism than about the variables in the original 
relation. In this example, the direct casual inference concerns aggregate variables, 
whereas the indirect causal inference concerns the individual-level variables, but 
presumably the same logic applies if the variables in the mechanism were at the same 
level as those of the primary causal claim. Hence, I agree with Reiss that “…it is not 
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necessary that the “mediating” variable obtains at a lower level than the original cause 
and effect variables” (2013, p.104). I suspect the same logic applies more broadly in 
cases in which a primary causal claim is supported by evidence of different kinds 
(Claveau, 2012; Staley, 2004). If so, then it is unclear whether the relevant notion of 
mechanism here involves any form of reduction, not even in the broad sense of 
underlying or constitutive structures. viii  
The strategy of abstraction and simple models discussed above constitutes the 
most common source of mechanistic hypotheses in economics (see also Reiss, 2008, 
pp.116-117).ix Assessing the plausibility of these mechanistic hypotheses is ultimately 
an empirical matter. I agree with Steel that there is not one set of methodologies that 
uniquely supplies mechanistic evidence, which can be obtained by laboratory and 
field experimentation, or as in the Donohue and Levitt’s example, by correlational 
studies. In Donohue and Levitt’s study, evidence in favor of the mechanistic 
hypothesis also came from studies in countries where for a time abortions had to be 
approved by the government. In these studies, children born from women who were 
denied the procedure were found to be more likely to engage in criminal behavior 
later on. Using such evidence in support of the causal claim about legalization of 
abortion and decline of criminality in the United States, however, involves a further 
inferential step – one concerning the relevant similarity between the countries in 
which the evidence was obtained and the United States. This is known as the problem 
of extrapolation, to which I now turn. 
VI. The problem of extrapolation 
The problem of extrapolation concerns how to justify transporting causal claims from 
one context, for example a laboratory experiment or one country, to another, the real 
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world or another country. Steel (2008) offers a comprehensive philosophical 
treatment of mechanism-based extrapolation. Mechanism-based extrapolation 
crucially involves the deployment of a methodology he calls comparative process 
tracing. The latter is a matter of comparing mechanisms in the model and in the target 
by focusing on stages where background knowledge tells us there are likely to be 
causally relevant differences and/or on those downstream stages where upstream 
differences are likely to have left a mark (see Figure 32.2). 
[Insert figure 32.2 here] 
Steel is optimistic that comparative process tracing can be used to justify 
extrapolation in biology, but he is more cautious with regard to economics (and social 
science more generally) for two reasons. The first is that for mechanism-based 
extrapolation to work, we need mechanisms that are modular, but policy interventions 
on some part of a mechanism might turn out to affect the mechanism’s overall 
structure. The second concerns uncertainty about the mechanisms responsible for 
economic phenomena. Let us consider each problem in turn starting from the latter. 
The viability of mechanism-based extrapolation in economics, Steel (2008) 
argues, is complicated by the uncertainty about the mechanisms responsible for 
economic phenomena. For example, in spite of sustained and systematic experimental 
study since its discovery in the 1970s, preference reversal -- “a behavioral tendency 
for the preference ordering of a pair of alternatives to depend, in a predictable way, on 
the process used to elicit it” (Starmer, 2008, p.1) -- still lacks a theoretical 
explanation. Yet, as Guala (2010) observes, uncertainty about the cause of preference 
reversal only tells us that further work is needed, not that uncertainty is an 
ineliminable and pervasive feature of economics experiments.  
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That the effect of policy interventions on causal structure constitutes a 
problem for economics is captured in the well-known Lucas critique, which states that 
since agents’ optimal behavior often changes in response to policy changes, many 
macroeconomic forecasts, which are based on assumptions about agents’ optimal 
behavior, are bound to fail (Lucas, 1976). In other words, it might be the case that 
policy interventions on some part of a mechanism affect the mechanism’s structure. 
There are two possible ways of addressing the difficulties posed by such “structure-
altering interventions”: an experimental and a theoretical one. First, at least in 
principle it is possible to design an economic experiment in which the intervention 
would alter the structure in the same way as the policy intervention, if implemented, 
would. The result of such an experiment could help us overcome the problem of 
structure-altering interventions and hence deploy mechanism-based extrapolation 
(Guala, 2010, p.1079). Since large-scale interventions are hard to implement in the 
laboratory or in the field, and experimenting on a smaller scale would still entail 
uncertainty about the effect of an implementation on a larger scale, however, Steel’s 
concern with structure-altering interventions remains a practical problem.  
The second route, suggested by Steel (2008, p.158), is to rely on a more 
fundamental theory to tell what kind of changes in causal structure the intervention is 
likely to produce. At present the most likely candidate in economics for such a theory 
is rational-choice theory.x Therefore, the issue turns on the appropriateness of 
rational-choice theory qua fundamental theory. In particular, Steel calls upon recent 
results in experimental economics, which show that small changes in variables that 
fall outside the domain of the theory have dramatic effects on behavior, casting 
doubts about whether rational-choice theory can help in anticipating the consequences 
of structure-altering interventions.  
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Steel’s last conclusion might be too hasty, however. It can be argued that 
experimental results concerning individual behavior do not suffice to demonstrate that 
rational-choice theory cannot be relied upon to anticipate changes in causal structure. 
Rational-choice theory indeed need not be interpreted as a theory about individual 
behavior as such, but as a theory of individual behavior in settings in which it is 
supported by the right institutional scaffolding (compare with Satz and Ferejohn, 
1994; Ross, 2014). Although the economics experiments that have attracted the most 
attention are those that demonstrate the existence of behavioral anomalies, these are 
not the only kind of experiments economists have been engaged with.  
Santos (2007), for example, distinguishes between technological and 
behavioral experiments. Behavioral experiments are aimed at investigating individual 
behavior and have often been interpreted as yielding results that are at odds with 
rational-choice theory. By contrast, technological experiments are aimed at 
investigating institutional (market) mechanisms. Used as complements to the 
theoretical models developed in the field of mechanism design, technological 
experiments have guided many of the successful applications of game theory to the 
design of real-world markets such as the Federal Communications Commission 
auctions for the allocation of telecommunication licenses (Roth, 2002). Santos (2007) 
attributes the success of technological experiments to the robustness of the relation 
between the designed institution and aggregate outcomes to changes in the 
environment (most notably, preferences). In other words, the market institution is so 
designed so as to ensure that the resulting actions are rational and income 
maximizing.  
Moreover, if what we need for mechanism-based extrapolation is information 
about the causal structure in the source and some relevant information about the 
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causal structure in the target, there is no need for the mechanism to include 
individual-level variables – think, for example, of a causal chain between aggregate-
level variables. Hoover (2001; 2009) can be interpreted as making a similar point 
when he argues that Lucas’s critique does not necessarily imply the necessity of 
individual-level mechanisms. Lucas’s critique holds that in order for estimated 
relationships to be stable across policy changes, those relationships need to capture 
the deep parameters in the economy, where deep parameters refer to “the fundamental 
ontological building blocks of the economy” (Hoover, 2009, p.393). To go from here 
to the indispensability of individual-level mechanisms requires the further assumption 
that those parameters are necessarily micro, which is not obvious. As in the previous 
discussion about causal inference, it is unclear whether reduction, or underlying 
constitutive structures, is involved in the context of mechanism-based extrapolation. 
Rather, it seems that the broader notions of mediating variables and causal chains 
might be sufficient. This is not a critique of Steel’s account of extrapolation – its main 
insight still stands regardless of the notion of a mechanism sufficient to get it off the 
ground. At this stage, the relevance of pointing at the possibility that intervening steps 
need not be at a lower level than the phenomenon to be explained only expands the 
range of cases in which extrapolation is legitimate. 
VII. Concluding remarks 
Some of the main debates in the philosophy and methodology of economics are 
intertwined with one or another use of the notion of mechanism. Specifically, we have 
examined two such notions: mechanisms as (theoretical hypotheses about) underlying 
structures and mechanisms as intervening variables. I have shown that at least some 
economic models aim at capturing mechanisms conceived as abstract descriptions of 
how social-level phenomena result from the actions and interactions of rational 
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agents, paralleling the idea of mechanisms as underlying structures. This modeling 
strategy is closely linked to economists’ commitment to methodological 
individualism, even though on closer inspection mechanistic explanation does not 
square well with strong versions of methodological individualism, nor are such strong 
versions apt descriptions of the actual practice of economics. Furthermore, we have 
seen that although mechanisms are held to aid both causal inference and 
extrapolation, it is not always clear whether the relevant notion of mechanism at stake 
is that of mechanisms as underlying causal structures or as intervening variables.  
It might then be that the centrality of the notion of mechanism is a product of 
the flexibility with which the notion itself is used rather than the role it actually plays 
in economics. If so, the traction of mechanistic ideas would improve by further clarity 
about what notion is at stake in a particular case. This is not to claim that the focus on 
mechanism in the philosophy of economics has had no value. On the contrary, 
reframing, for example, the age-old issue about methodological individualism in 
terms of mechanistic explanation contributed to make clear that although explaining 
by mechanisms is valuable, there is no reason to suppose that such mechanisms 
should be exclusively at the individual level. Similarly, attention to mechanisms has 
brought to the fore the function that different kinds of evidence have in both causal 
inference and extrapolation and, hence, the importance of different methods of 
generating evidence. This is especially topical now that the toolkit of empirical 
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sciences. As I interpret it, however, Steel’s point is that current alternatives have not 
yet reached the status currently enjoyed by rational-choice theory. This does not rule 
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Figure	32.1.	Coleman’s	boat.	The	mechanism	connecting	C	(crime	rate)	to	U	
(unemployment	level),	where	x	and	y	represent	individual-level	variables	and	
the	arrows	represent	causal	relations.		
 
 
Figure	32.2.	Comparative	process	tracing.	Stages	of	the	mechanisms	leading	
from	C	(crime	rate)	to	U	(unemployment)	in	the	model	and	in	the	target.	The	
arrows	represent	causal	relations,	the	dashed	arrows	represent	relations	to	be	
inferred	about	the	mechanism	in	target,	and	the	double	lines	represent	
differences	and	similarities.	Adapted	from	Guala,	2010,	p.	1074.	
	
 
